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HIGHER EDUCATION FUNDING
The expansion of higher education throughout the OECD-and beyond-is both nec-
essary and desirable. But it is costly, and faces competing imperatives for public
spending. Higher education finance is therefore salient to an extent that is not yet
fully appreciated in all countries, and is also immensely sensitive politically. This
paper1 sets out the core lessons for financing higher education deriving from eco-
nomic theory and puts them alongside lessons from country experience. The UK
reforms announced in 2004 are assessed against the backdrop of those two ele-
ments. A concluding section briefly maps out unfinished business.
I. INTRODUCTION
Higher education matters. No longer only a consumption good enjoyed by an élite,
it is an important element in national economic performance. So it is no accident
that the numbers in higher education have increased in all advanced countries.
However, a mass, high-quality university system is expensive and competes for pub-
lic funds with other imperatives.
Nicholas Barr, a London School of Economics professzora 2006. november 23-án tar-
tott előadást a Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem és a Diákhitel Központ Zrt. által közösen
rendezett konferencián. A konferenciát az egyetem rektora, Mészáros Tamás vezette,
előadást tartott többek között Manherz Károly, az Oktatási és Kulturális Minisztérium
szakállamtitkára és Hrubos Ildikó, az egyetem rektorhelyettese. A következőkben Barr
professzor megszerkesztett előadását közöljük, a szöveget elsőként közreadó Oxford
Review of Economic Policy hozzájárulásával. 
Barr professzor szerint vitathatatlan, hogy az OECD országokban ki kell terjeszteni
a felsőoktatást és emelni kell a minőségét, ám ez egy igen költséges feladat. A felsőok-
tatási kiadások fontosságát azonban nem minden ország értékeli egyformán, és
ráadásul politikailag kényes terület. A professzor összefoglalja a közgazdaságtu-
dományi irodalom fő következtetéseit a felsőoktatás finanszírozásáról, és összehason-
lítja ezeket néhány ország gyakorlatával. A legfontosabb következtetések: (I) az egyete-
mek nem irányíthatóak központilag; (II) a hallgatóknak is részt kell venniük a költ-
ségek finanszírozásában; (III) ehhez azonban jól megtervezett diákhitel-konstruk-
ciókra van szükség; (IV) valamint meg kell találni az állam és a piac közti egyensúlyt.
Nicholas Barr vizsgálja továbbá, hogy az Egyesült Királyság 2004-ben elindított fel-
sőoktatási reformja mennyire van összhangban az említett elméletekkel és más orszá-
gok gyakorlatával, végül pedig felvázolja a továbbiakban szükséges lépéseket. 
1 This paper draws on Iain Crawford's and my 15-year collaboration (see Barr and Crawford, forthcom-
ing), on assistance from Colin Ward and his team at the Student Loans Company on factual matters and
administrative feasibility, and on work by the three of us advising the Hungarian government. I am
also grateful for helpful comments from Howard Glennerster, Michael Shattock, the editors, and for
factual matters from officials at the New Zealand Ministry of Education.
Though in part about the British reforms announced in 2004, the paper is gener-
al in its application. It starts with some background issues. Section II sets out lessons
from economic theory, largely rooted in the economics of information. Section III
considers lessons from country experience, which complement and illustrate the
theoretical analysis. Section IV assesses the 2004 Higher Education Act in England
against the backdrop of the previous two sections, on the assumption that the legis-
lation going through Parliament at the time of writing is not substantially changed.
The concluding section considers the unfinished agenda.
Some caveats about what the paper is not about. The emphasis on funding does
not imply the crude fallacy, against which WoIf (2002) rightly cautions, that
increased spending automatically increases economic growth. The quality of higher
education and its ability to adapt to changing economic conditions are critically
important, and central to later arguments that market forces do a better job than
central planning in matching the skills of graduates with their own preferences and
the demands of the labour market.
Second, the concentration on the economic importance of higher education
does not diminish the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, nor downplay the cen-
trality of academic freedom, nor deny that for many people getting a degree has
important consumption benefits and is not simply an investment in their career.
Third, the paper focuses on the finance of teaching, setting to one side the issues
raised by research funding (on which see McNay, 1999; Roberts, 2003). Fourth, it is
rooted in economic theory, but is not quantitative. Finally, though country experi-
ence is discussed, this is not a comparative paper.
(I) BACKGROUND ISSUES
Higher education matters, first, because of the nature of technological change.
Though it can reduce the need for skills (e.g. computers are increasingly user-
friendly), it mostly increases the demand for skilled workers. Amplifying the trend,
skills date more quickly and need to be replenished. The 'information age' can be
taken to mean a need for education and training that is larger than previously, more
diverse, and repeated, in the sense that period is retraining is required.
Demographic change offers a second reason for expansion. The rising propor-
tion of older people foreshadows increased spending on pensions, medical care,
and long-term care. Part of the solution is to increase output sufficiently to meet the
combined expectations of workers and pensioners. If workers are becoming rela-
tively more scarce, the efficient response is to increase labour productivity.
Demographic change is thus an argument for additional spending on investment in
both technology and human capital.
Two debates shed light on implicit assumptions which often underpin opposing
arguments. The first is about the nature of higher education, which can be charac-
terized in terms of two stylized models.
 In the 'Anglo-American' model, policy sees higher education as heterogeneous,
regards this as proper, and encourages diversity, varied forms of provision, and
quality comparisons between them.
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 In the 'Scandinavian model', policy is based on the assumption that institutions
are homogeneous, and therefore treats them equally and regards all pro-
grammes as equal.
This paper argues that the second model, whatever its merits, is incompatible with
mass higher education, and that funding should therefore support a diverse, decen-
tralized system. That line of argument is supported by the theoretical discussion in
section II.
The second debate is about ability to pay. There is agreement that this should be
a central element in policy design, but disagreement about how it should be mea-
sured. Should it be based on current income - i.e. on where people start? The strate-
gy to which this leads is support for people whose family is poor, even if recipients
end up becoming rich. Or should ability to pay be based on future income that is,
on where people end up? This approach leads to finance based on income-contin-
gent loans or graduate taxes, with more generous support, ex post, where someone
derives little financial benefit from his or her degree.
Section II argues that the second approach is correct for people who are well
informed. Thus support for the generality of students should derive from a mix of
tax funding and income-contingent loans (i.e. loans with repayments calculated as
x per cent of the borrower's subsequent earnings). However, there is a socio-
economic gradient in the extent to which people are well inform ed, so that child-
ren from disadvantaged backgrounds may not even think of going to university. For
such people, the first approach may be required.
Policy objectives
Higher education in Britain faces three widely agreed problems.
 Universities have too few resources: real funding per student almost halved in
the 20 years to 2000 (Greenaway and Haynes, 2002, Figure 1).
 Student support is inadequate (Callender and Wilkinson, 2003).
 Access is unequal. In 2002, 81 per cent of children from professional back-
grounds went to university; the comparable figure for children from manual
backgrounds was 15 per cent (UK Education and Skills Select Committee, 2002,
p. 19).
There is also widespread agreement about two core objectives: strengthening qual-
ity and diversity, both for their own sake and for reasons of national economic per-
formance; and improving access, again for both efficiency and equity reasons. At
least in the UK, therefore, the argument is less about what policy is trying to do than
about the best way of doing so.
(II) BLIND ALLEYS
Before proceeding, it is helpful to clear the undergrowth by considering a series of
often-asserted propositions.
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Higher education is a basic right and should therefore be free.
The assertion that access to higher education is a right is a value judgement that
commands widespread agreement. But it does not follow that higher education
must be free. We all agree that food is a basic right, yet competitive supply at market
prices is uncontentious. The equity objective is not free higher education, but a sys-
tem in which no bright person is denied a place because he or she comes from a dis-
advantaged background.
In arguing for free higher education, however, people are reaching towards an
important point: there is a strong case for making higher education free at the point
of use. The arrangements set out below are designed to make that possible.
It is immoral to charge for education.
The same arguments apply. It is immoral (in my view) if people with the aptitude
and desire are denied access to higher education because they cannot afford it; it is
also immoral if underfunded earlier education means that they never even aspire to
university. Similarly, it is immoral if someone is malnourished. But that is not an
argument for making food free for everyone, including the rich; rather, it argues for
income transfers so that everyone can afford a healthy diet.
Making something free for everyone can be justified in efficiency terms, where
market failures make consumer choice problematic, and in equity terms, where the
commodity is consumed by everyone- for example, school education and health
care. As discussed below, higher education conforms with neither criterion. As a
result, taxpayer subsidies are regressive and, as already noted, free higher education
has done badly on access.
Elitism has no place in higher education.
Argument of ten blurs two separate elements. Many people, including me, agree
with the value judgement that social elitism is wrong-social background per se
should not influence access to the best universities. In contrast, intellectual élitism
is both proper and desirable. The best musicians and athletes are chosen precisely
because of their abilities, irrespective of whether their background is poor (Pele) or
middle class (Tiger Woods). There is nothing inequitable about intellectually elite
universities. The equity objective should be a system in which the ability of the
brightest students to study at the most intellectually demanding universities is unre-
lated to their socioeconomic background.
Graduates pay for their higher education through income tax.
It is sometimes argued that higher education should be wholly tax funded because
graduates earn more than non-graduates and therefore pay for their higher educa-
tion through subsequent higher income tax payments. There are three counter-
arguments.
14 KÖZ-GAZDASÁG 2007/2
 Income tax raises only one-quarter of government revenue and is paid by many
more non-graduates than graduates: 82 per cent of working-age adults in the
UK do not have a degree (OECD, 2002, Table A3.la).
 Suppose a person with a degree pays an additional L100,000 in tax, of which
L20,000 is deemed to pay for his higher education. By implication, he therefore
pays L80,000 towards the National Health Service, schools, etc.- less than the
Ll00,000 contributed to those services by someone with identical lifetime
income who has not been to university. This is horizontally inequitable.
 If the argument is that the taxpayer gets a 'good deal' by paying for people's
investment in higher education, the same logic says that the US taxpayer should
pay all Microsoft's development costs.
A further argument against sole reliance on taxpayer funding is a practical one.
There are limits to taxation, not least because of political pressures, which collide
with other priorities for public spending. Thus it is no accident that real funding per
student declined sharply over the years as UK student numbers increased.
II. LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC THEORY
Economic theory offers three strong lessons for financing higher education (for
fuller discussion, see Barr, 200la, chs 10-13): the days of central planning have gone;
graduates should share in the costs of higher education; and well-designed student
loans have core characteristics.
(I) LESSON 1: THE DAYS OF CENTRAL PLANNING HAVE GONE
Present arrangements
Central planning of UK universities has increased considerably since the mid-1970s.
The problem has not been academic freedom, but reduced economic freedom
through price control, quantity control, and heavily bureaucratic quality control.
Price control. UK universities are free to set fees for non-EU undergraduates and
for all postgraduates. For UK and other EU undergraduates, fees were forbidden
until 1998; since then, universities have been required to charge a flat fee (L1,150 in
2004/5), i.e. the same for all subjects at all universities. It is illegal to charge more
and illegal to charge less.
Quantity control. Universities in England and Wales contract with the Higher
Education Funding Council for England to teach a specified number of students.
Though those controls have varied, universities have been penalized for recruiting
fewer students than their quota and for recruiting too many.2
15T A N U L M Á N Y O K
2 'Prince William's university has been fined L175,000 for attracting too many students. Applications ...
leapt by 45 per cent after it was revealed that the prince planned to start his studies there last autumn.
However, higher education funding rules penalize universities that exceed their recruitment targets.'
(Independent (London), 29 March 2002)
Monitoring quality. Universities are rightly held accountable for their receipt of
public funds and rightly subject to quality control in the interests of consumer pro-
tection. However, the specific methods, notably the regime to assure teaching qual-
ity in the late 1990s, have been roundly criticized.3
The following analysis argues that central planning is no longer feasible and, sep-
arately, that it is not desirable.
Central planning of higher education: no longer feasible
The literature on the communist system (see Kornai, 1992, ch. 9) distinguishes
extensive and intensive growth. The former refers to an era when surplus inputs,
notably agricultural labour, could be brought into the industrial sector, character-
ized by rapid growth in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. Intensive growth, when sur-
plus inputs had be en used up, depends on technological advance and more effi-
cient use of inputs. Central planning was not able to cope with the more complex
problems that arose when inputs became scarce and with more advanced technolo-
gy, as manifested by declining, and in some countries negative, growth rates in the
1980s and 1990s.
The analogy with higher education is instructive. Forty years ago, with a small
university system offering degrees in a limited range of subjects, it was possible,
as a polite myth, to assume that all universities were equally good and hence fund
them broadly equally. Today there are more universities, more students, and
much greater diversity of subjects. As a result, the characteristics and the costs of
different degrees at different institutions vary widely, so that institutions need to
be funded differentially. In principle, this could be done by an all knowing cen-
tral planner. In practice, the problem is too complex. A mass system in an increas-
ingly complex world needs a funding mechanism which allows institutions to
charge differential prices to different costs and missions. Central planning is no
longer feasible.
Central planning of higher education: undesirable
Prices give signals to buyers and sellers. In contrast with communist central plan-
ning, the OECD countries all have mixed economies in which most resources are
allocated by the market.
However, markets can fail-information failures being key-giving a robust case for
public provision of health care and school education (see Barr, 2004, or, more
briefly, Barr, 1998). Consider the following stylized facts about health care: con-
sumers are imperfectly informed because much health care is highly technical; treat-
ment is frequently not by choice but because of an external event, such as breaking
a leg; and there is of ten only limited choice about the type of treatment. Much of
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3 A prized possession is the photograph I took of the 14 filing cabinets of material for the 3 1 day visit
to assess LSE 's teaching of politics in October 2000.
the efficiency case for the National Health Service is based on these facts. With food,
the story is different. We are generally well informed about what we like and about
its costs, and there is considerable choice over how we meet those needs. These
technical differences start to explain why we ensure access to health care by giving
it to people (largely) free; with food, in contrast, we ensure that a person has access
to nutrition by paying her a pension and letting her buy her own food at market
prices.
In the case of school education, small children are not well informed; attendance
is compulsory, so that education is consumed by all young people; for younger chil-
dren, the range of choice about content is constrained; and a case can be made in
terms of social cohesion for providing all children with a similar educational expe-
rience. These arguments and others provide a compelling case for publicly funded
and publicly organized schools.
Higher education contrasts strongly. Students are generally well informed and
can and should be made better informed. The process is assisted because going to
university can be anticipated (unlike finding a doctor to deal with injury after a road
accident), so that students have time to acquire the information they need, and time
to seek advice. Second, people can choose whether or not to go to university - it is
precisely that fact that has made taxpayer-funding of higher education so regressive.
Finally, the choice of which subject to study and at which university is, quite prop-
erly, large and growing.
It can be argued that students are well informed, or potentially well informed,
and hence better able than planners to make choices which conform with their own
interests and those of the economy. To maintain otherwise is to argue that even with
extensive regulation, students (the best and the brightest, by assumption) are
unable to choose sensibly. The argument of well-informed choice is central, and
underpins the efficiency case for variable fees in section II(v). It implies that price
signals will be useful and hence that competition will improve welfare by making
universities more responsive to the preferences of students and the needs of
employers.
Though that proposition is robust, two caveats are discussed below. First, stu-
dents from poorer backgrounds might not be fully informed, with implications for
access generally and debt aversion in particular. Second, though the approach gives
a greater role to students, employers, and universities in making choices about sub-
ject, content, and mix, it does not imply unrestricted markets. Rather, the analysis
points to regulated markets.
(II) LESSON 2: GRADUATES SHOULD SHARE IN THE COSTS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
There are strong qualitative arguments that higher education creates benefits to
society above those to the individual-benefits in terms of growth, social cohesion
and the transmission of values (Bynner and Edgerton, 200 1; Bynner et al., 2003),
and the development of knowledge for its own sake. Those arguments suggest that
taxpayer subsidies to higher education should be a permanent part of the land-
scape. Quantifying those benefits, however, entails a series of difficulties, not least
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because it is hard to separate the effects of education from other determinants of a
person's productivity.4 Thus the division of costs between the taxpayer and the
graduate - like the definition of poverty - has no definitive answer.
In contrast, there is much firmer evidence of the substantial private returns from
a degree (e.g. Blundell et al., 2000). Such estimates are based on data for an earlier,
smaller cohort of graduates, suggesting that increased numbers may drive down
those returns. But Blundell et al. rightly point out that the demand for graduates is
also increasing. To the extent that demand and supply increase broadly in step,
there is no reason why private returns should fall.
In sum, there is limited quantitative evidence of external benefits and robust evi-
dence of private benefits. The latter suggests that it is efficient that graduates bear
some of the costs. In that case, however, the design of student loans becomes criti-
cal.
(III) LESSON 3: WELL-DESIGNED STUDENT LOANS HAVE CORE CHARACTERISTICS
Discussion thus far argues for a graduate contribution for the following reasons.
 It is efficient in microeconomic terms because of the private benefits of a
degree and, given earlier arguments, because price signals in higher education
are useful.
 It is necessary for fiscal reasons, given the high cost of mass higher education
and competing fiscal pressures, such as population ageing and combating
social exclusion.
 It improves equity by reducing the regressivity of a system in which the
degrees of mainly better-off people are paid for by people who on average are
less well off.
This section argues that graduate contributions should be based on student loans
which have income-contingent repayments, charge a rational interest rate, and are
large enough to cover tuition charges and realistic living costs.
Income-contingent repayments
I have argued for many years (Barr, 1989), as have others before me (Friedman,
1955; Peacock and Wiseman, 1962; Prest, 1962; Glennerster et al., 1968) that student
loans should have income-contingent repayments, i.e. repayments calculated as x
per cent of the borrower's subsequent earnings, collected alongside income tax or
National Insurance contributions, until the borrower has repaid. There are both effi-
ciency and equity arguments for that position.
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4 The screening hypothesis argues, first, that education beyond a basic level does not increase individ-
ual productivity and, second, that firms seek high-ability workers but are unable, prior to employing
them, to distinguish them from those with low ability. Individuals, therefore, have an incentive to
make themselves distinctive by some sort of signal. According to the screening hypothesis, post-pri-
mary education fills exactly that function: it gives a signal to prospective employers. Just as an individ-
ual's good health may be due more to a strong constitution than to medical care, so, according to this
view, is productivity the result of natural ability rather than post-primary education.
Problems with conventional loans. It is useful to use a conventional loan - for
example, to buy a house - as a benchmark. The loan will have a fixed duration (e.g.
25 years) and a positive interest rate. Monthly repayments are entirely determined
by three variables: the size of the loan, its duration, and the interest rate. Apart from
adjustments reflecting changes in the interest rate, the monthly repayment is fixed.
Buying a house is a relatively low-risk activity.
a) The buyer generally knows what he is buying, having lived in a house all his
life.
b) The house is unlikely to fall down. 
c) The real value of the house will generally increase.
d) If income falls, making repayments problematic, he has the option to sell the
house.
e) Because the house acts as security for the loan, he can get a loan on good
terms.
For these reasons, the market provides home loans. The contrast with lending to
finance investment in human capital - for example, a university degree - is sharp.
Demand-side problems. Earlier discussion concluded that university students are
well informed (element (a)). However, some people, particularly from poor back-
grounds, may be poorly informed, an issue taken up in section II(v). In addition, all
borrowers face risk and uncertainty because (b), (c), and (d), though true for hous-
ing, are less true for investment in skills. A qualification can 'fall down' , because a
borrower may fail his exams. He still has to make loan repayments, but without the
qualification that would have led to the increased earnings from which to make
those repayments. Separately, even well-informed students face risk: though the
average private return to investment in human capital is positive, the re is consider-
able variation about that average. Finally (element (d)), someone who has borrowed
to acquire a qualification, but then has low earnings and high repayments does not
have the option to sell the qualification, further increasing exposure to risk.
For all these reasons, borrowing to finance investment in human capital exposes
the borrower to more risk and uncertainty than borrowing to buy a house. The
problem arises for all borrowers, and most acutely for those from poorer back-
grounds. As a result, borrowing to finance investment in human capital will be inef-
ficiently low.
Supply-side problems. Lenders also face risk and uncertainty. If I borrow to buy
a house, the house acts as security. If I am unable to repay, the lender can repossess
the house, sell it, and take what he is owed. Deliberate default is not a problem:
though I could disappear, I could not take the house with me. For both reasons,
loans are available on good terms. An analogous arrangement with human capital
would allow the lender, in default, to repossess my brain, sell it, and take what he is
owed. That being ruled out, lenders have no security: they face uncertainty about
the riskiness of an applicant - whether the person will acquire the qualification and
whether their subsequent earnings will allow him or her to re pay - and therefore
charge a risk premium.5 A risk premium assessed by a well-informed lender is effi-
cient (analogous to higher automobile insurance premiums for bad drivers). But
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5 The problem is compounded by adverse selection; see Barr (200 la, pp. 177-8).
since lenders are not well informed about the riskiness of an applicant, they face
incentives to cherry pick, i.e. to find ways of lending only to the best risks, analo-
gous to private medical insurance. An obvious way to do so is to lend only to stu-
dents who can provide security, e.g. a home-owning parent. The resulting lending
will be inefficiently low.
Thus conventional loans lead to inefficiently low borrowing and lending. They
are also inequitable. The various efficiency problems impact most on people from
poor backgrounds, women, and ethnic minorities, who may be less well inform ed
about the benefits of a qualification and therefore less prepared to risk a loan. In
addition, these groups are likely to be on the wrong end of cherry picking.
The case for income-contingent loans. Income-contingent repayments have a
profound effect in ways that are not widely understood (Barr, 1991, 200la, ch. 12).
Low earners make low or no repayments. People with low lifetime earnings do not
fully repay. A larger loan (or a higher interest rate) has no effect on monthly repay-
ments, which depend only on the person's income; instead, a person with a larger
loan will repay for longer.
In efficiency terms, income-contingent loans are designed explicitly to protect
borrowers from excessive risk; in equity terms, they assist access because they have
built-in insurance against inability to repay. Following through the consumption
smoothing analogy, we pay National Insurance now to finance our pension later;
income-contingent graduate contributions are the mirror-image.6
A rational interest rate
Well-designed loans have income-contingent repayments. They should also charge a
rational interest rate. However, many schemes incorporate an interest subsidy
whose aim is to promote access by preventing excessive debt. The aim is commend-
able, but blanket interest subsidies will not achieve it. Like many price distortions,
they cause inefficiency and inequity. Current UK arrangements, like those in some
other countries (e.g. Australia), charge a zero real interest rate.
The first resulting problem is cost. In the UK, about one-third of all money lent
to students is not repaid because of the subsidy, partly because loans extend over a
long duration, and partly because of arbitrage (i.e. students who do not need the
loan nevertheless borrowing as much as they are allowed and putting the money
into a savings account to make a profit). Second, the subsidy impedes quality
because student support, being politically salient, crowds out the funding of univer-
sities. Third, it impedes access: loans are expensive, therefore rationed and there-
fore too small.
Finally, interest subsidies are deeply regressive. They do not help students (grad-
uates make repayments, not students). They help low-earning graduates only slight-
ly, since unpaid debt is eventually forgiven. They do not help high-earning graduates
20 KÖZ-GAZDASÁG 2007/2
6 It was for this reason that my first specific UK proposal (Barr, 1989) argued that income-contingent
repayments should be an add-on to National Insurance contributions, an idea originally suggested by
Mervyn King.
early in their careers: with income-contingent loans, monthly repayments depend
only on earnings; interest rates only affect the duration of the loan. Thus the major
beneficiaries are successful professionals in mid-career, whose loan repayments are
switched off earlier because of the subsidy (for fuller discussion, see Barr, 2003, sec-
tion 4.3).
The discussion thus far leads to the question of what interest rate is efficient. The
simplest arrangement would charge the government's cost of borrowing. If all stu-
dents repaid in full, this would make it possible for the loan to stand on its own feet.
In practice, however, there will be losses because of low lifetime earnings, early
death, etc.-such non repayment being a deliberate design feature of income-contin-
gent loans. The taxpayer could cover those losses, as currently in the UK. Alter-
natively, the cohort of borrowers could cover at least some of the loss through what
is, in effect, a form of social insurance. In New Zealand in the 1990s, for example,
the interest rate on student loans was set about l per cent above the government's
cost of borrowing, thus, according to official estimates, covering about half the loss
on the portfolio, the taxpayer covering the remaining loss.7 There is also a case, dis-
cussed in section II(v), for interest subsidies targeted at low earners.
Large enough to cover tuition fees and realistic living costs
Loans are an instrument for consumption smoothing. Where there are no distor-
tions such as interest subsidies, the amount people choose to borrow should not be
strongly constrained. An implication is that loans should be large enough to cover
tuition fees and realistic living costs, resolving such problems as student poverty,
excessive reliance on expensive credit-card debt, long hours spent earning money,
and/or forced reliance on family support. A ceiling on borrowing each year and on
the number of years for which a student may borrow would offer protection against
improvidence.
Entitlement to a loan that covers all costs is not an argument against earning
opportunities or family support, but for allowing individuals to make choices in the
face of an efficient budget constraint (for fuller discussion, see Barr, 1993). A ratio-
nal interest rate-another price signal-is thus central to ensuring adequate student
support.
(IV) THE BALANCE BETWEEN MARKET AND STATE
As discussed in section II(i), the case against central planning does not mean, and
should not mean, that government is marginalized.
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7 In New Zealand the Student Loan Scheme Act f992 requires that the Student Loan Scheme interest
rates be set annually and that, in determining the rates, the Governor-General has regard to, but shall
not be bound by: 'the movements, as determined by the Government Statistician, that have occurred
in the Consumers Price Index in the year to the 30th day of September immediately preceding the
making of the regulations' and 'the costs to the Crown of the Student Loan Scheme, including the cost
of Government borrowing in the year to the 30th day of September immediately preceding the mak-
ing of the regulations'. In the later 1990s, the interest rate was based on the 10-year bond rate.
Part of the government's role is to empower demand:
 as partial funder of higher education, not !east because of its external benefits;
 as organizer of student loans, to provide a mechanism for individual consump-
tion smoothing in the face of the capital-market imperfections discussed earli-
er;8
 as promoter of access. Options for consumption smoothing may be sufficient
for people who are well-informed, but further action, including grants and
other activities discussed in section II(v), is necessary for those who are not.
On the supply side, government has a role:
 as regulator, to ensure that satisfactory quality assurance is in place. Consumers
may be well informed, but that does not mean that they are perfectly informed,
justifying quality assurance for reasons of consumer protection. But this task
does not necessarily mean a state-run bureaucracy (Brown, 2000). A minimal-
ist approach would require universities to publish timely, accurate perfor-
mance data on their web sites - for example, the destinations of its recent grad-
uates - giving prospective students the information they need to vote with their
feet;9
 as setter of incentives. In addition to targeting resources at particular individu-
als for reasons of access, government properly sets incentives in other ways. It
can target resources at particular subjects. Even if we agree that students and
employers are well informed, that does not deny government the right to have
views about subject mix. It can be argued that subjects such as accounting, law,
and economics can look after themselves. But governments might wish to tar-
get additional resources at subjects such as classics, music, or dram a, or (a
perennial worry of governments) at engineering. Government might also wish
to target resources at particular institutions for reasons of regional balance.
One further set of incentives - the degree of competition - requires separate discus-
sion. At one extreme, the government could intervene only minimally on the supply
side. Universities would compete for students; those attracting large numbers flour-
ish and expand, those failing to do so go to the wall. Universities, however, are not
the conventional firms of economic theory: they do not make a homogeneous prod-
uct; they do not maximize profit; and the 'product' is not well defined (see Winston,
1999). Thus red-in-tooth-and-claw competition is not the best environment for high-
er education. But this is not the only approach. The more government ties funding
to specific subjects or institutions, the less powerful is competition - in the extreme,
mimicking a system of central planning. Competition is more usefully thought of as
a continuum, from completely unconstrained (law of the jungle) to 100 per cent
constrained (pure central planning), or anywhere in between.
The approach thus allows intervention to foster both distributional and educa-
tional objectives. The system can be as redistributive as desired; and the degree of
competition is a policy variable, with different answers possible for different sub-
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8 See Palacios (2004) for a proposed arrangement for private income-contingent loans.
9 Students themselves are an important source of information. Student satisfaction is not all that mat-
ters, but that is not a reason for ignoring it. The 2004 UK legislation includes help for student organi-
zations in gathering relevant information.
jects. The resulting system is efficient, because outcomes are determined not by a
single, dominant - and often badly informed and ineffective - arm of government,
but by the interacting decisions of students, universities, and employers, subject to
transparent influence by government. Particularly with complex mass systems of
higher education, this approach is more likely than central planning to achieve indi-
vidual and national objectives.
(V) A GENERAL FUNDING STRATEGY
The preceding analysis points to a strategy with three elements: variable fees (Le.
prices) assist the efficient allocation of resources within higher education; well-
designed loans provide consumption smoothing, thereby assisting efficient alloca-
tion over a person's life cycle; and measures to promote access improve equity.
Leg 1. Variable fees
Universities should be free to vary their tuition fees, though, as discussed later, there
is a case for a ceiling. Students should be helped to pay through Legs 2 and 3, dis-
cussed below. Charges should be deferred: thus graduates make repayments, not stu-
dents.
Variable fees - not least because they are so contentious in Europe (though taken
for granted in the USA) - require careful justification.
The efficiency case. A major conclusion of the theoretical argument in section
II(i) is that price signals are useful in higher education, improving efficiency and,
through competition, making the system more responsive to student and employer
preferences.
Resources are misallocated if students face no price signals between subjects.
Employers want people with quantitative skills and computer literacy. Both mathe-
matics and engineering graduates have these skills, but one degree is considerably
more expensive than the other. In the absence of price signals, students are indiffer-
ent; the taxpayer is not.
The same is true of the choice of university: a well taught cheaper course at a
local university might well suit a student better than a more expensive course; there
are gains for the student, the taxpayer, and (through increased competition) the
higher education system if the student can give the right signal in responding to the
price mechanism.
As well as distorting demand, fixed prices also have adverse effects on the supply
side. Price ceilings erode incentives to improve quality (whose costs cannot be cov-
ered by price increases); price floors erode incentives to increased efficiency
(whose benefits cannot be appropriated through lower prices). Fiat fees, including
zero fees, are both a floor and a ceiling, and thus particularly inimical to efficiency
gains.
These arguments are rooted in the economics of information, not in ideology.
The argument that price should have no effect on a student's choice of subject or
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university is wrong because it uses a price subsidy to pursue equity objectives. This
is inefficient and, as argued shortly, also inequitable.
The previous paragraphs relate to microeconomic efficiency. A second efficien-
cy aspect is more macroeconomic, in that variable fees make funding open ended.
With flat fees, the Treasury controls the funding envelope. If tax funding falls (for
example, because of the competing claims of nursery education and health care), so
does university income - the example of Australia, discussed later, being a case in
point. With variable fees, in contrast, funding is open ended. Universities have at
least some autonomy over their income stream.
The equity case. Perhaps counter-intuitively, variable fees are not only more effi-
cient than flat fees, but also fairer, notably by facilitating redistribution from better-
off to worse-off. One of my earliest newspaper articles criticized the 1974 Labour
government for restoring universal milk subsidies. The aim was to help the poor, but
the subsidy was worth more to the middle class because they drank more milk.
Much more progressive to have charged an unsubsidized price and used the result-
ing savings to increase pensions, child benefit, and poverty relief.
Variable fees replace the former strategy, price subsidies for milk, by the lat-
ter, income transfers targeted at particular people. The strategy has two ele-
ments.
 Variable fees introduce higher charges for those who can afford them (note
that with income-contingent loans, 'can afford' refers to a person's earnings as
a graduate, not to family circumstances while a student).
 Redistributive policies help poor people to pay those charges.
To an economist, these elements are staggeringly familiar: the first, a price increase,
represents a movement along the demand curve. Taken alone, this element would
harm access. However (a) the fees are deferred (Leg 2, below), and (b), there are tar-
geted transfers to groups for whom access is fragile (Leg 3). This moves their
demand curve outward.
Thus the strategy is deeply progressive. It shifts resources from today's best-off
(who lose some of their fee subsidies) to today's worst-off (who receive a grant) and
tomorrow' s worst-off (who, with income-contingent repayments, do not repay their
loan in full).
As well as redistributing between people, variable fees facilitate redistribution
between institutions. With flat fees or tax funding, the volume of resources going to
the sector is fixed by government, so that prestigious universities and local institu-
tions compete for the same pot of money in a zero sum game. Variable fees start to
address this gridlock.
Third, variable fees are directly fairer. Flat fees force someone going to a small
local university to pay the same fee as someone going to an internationally
renowned one. This is inequitable. With the milk subsidy, at least everyone got
broadly the same quality of milk. In countries with a diverse higher education sys-
tem, charging everyone the same fee is more like taxing beer to subsidize cham-
pagne.
A fourth part of the equity puzzle arises if a country controls fees for home stu-
dents but allows greater freedom for overseas students. In the UK context, this caus-
es a problem that was both predictable and predicted:
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Variable fees, by reducing or eliminating the price differential, avoid such dis-
crimination.
The resulting landscape. Each university sets a fee for each of its degrees, though,
for the reasons set out in section III(i), subject to a maximum. Fees would be influ-
enced by the level of demand for each degree and by its cost. Demand would be
influenced by educational factors (the university's reputation for teaching, comple-
tion rates, subsequent destinations, and employment rates) and by broader aspects
(ancient buildings, access to the city centre).
Under such a system, economics at Oxford might charge a higher fee than clas-
sics, with potential adverse effects on staff-student ratios in classics and on the abil-
ity of students from poor backgrounds to afford economics. These are valid worries
in a pure market system. That, however, is not the model to which economic theory
points. The major continuing role of government was discussed earlier, notably in
promoting access and through its ability to target resources at particular subjects,
for example classics. The result is a market that can make beneficial use of price sig-
nals, but a regulated market. In an English context, universities will have more free-
dom, but constrained by the Higher Education Funding Council, the Access
Regulator, and the fees cap.
Why not fees decided by government? As argued in section II(i), with a mass and
diverse higher education system, the problem is too complex for a central planner
to decide the different efficient price for each degree at each university. Why not
flat fees that rise over time? As argued above, this is equivalent to a simultaneous
price floor and price ceiling.
Variable fees alone, however, would impede access - hence the other two legs of
the strategy.
Leg 2. A well-designed loan scheme
Loans should have income-contingent repayments and should charge an interest
rate broadly equal to the government's cost of borrowing. The full loan should be
large enough to cover tuition fees and realistic living costs, and all students should
be eligible for a full loan, i.e. entitlement should not be income tested. As a result,
higher education is free at the point of use, unless students choose to pay in part
through earning activities or family support. With a rational interest rate, the re is
no major distortion to such choices.
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A further impediment to access is the incentive to discriminate against British students. A
fiat fee will continue the erosion of quality at the best universities, which face the biggest
shortfalls in funding. British students could suffer in one of two ways. The quality of the
best institutions might fall; though British students could still get places, the quality of the
degree would be less. Alternatively, the best institutions will largely stop teaching British
undergraduates (for whom they receive on average L4,000 per year) and will use the fees
from foreign undergraduates (around L8,000 per year) to preserve their excellence. The
government is considering trying to prevent British universities from charging additional
fees to UK/EU students… [This] ends up harming the very people it is aimed at helping.
(Barr and Crawford, 1998, p. 80)
Some amplification is needed about interest rates. The default rate should be
related to the government's cost of borrowing. However, if someone has extended
spells out of the labour force, his or her loan can spiral upwards. In terms of strict
rationality that should not matter, since repayments will never exceed x per cent of
monthly earnings; and if the person never fully repays that is not a problem. But in
practice, large nominal debts worry people. Thus, though there is a strong case
against blanket interest subsidies, the re are good arguments for targeted subsidies,
discussed below, for people with low earnings or out of the labour force.
Leg 3. Action to promote access
At this stage we return to the debate about whether ability to pay should be assessed
relative to a student's current income, i.e. where he starts from, or his future income,
i.e. where he ends up? The latter is philosophically appealing, and it is therefore
sometimes argued (a) that income-contingent loans have built-in insurance against
inability to repay and, to that extent, are a no-lose bet, and therefore (b) that provid-
ed loans are large enough to make higher education free at the point of use, such
loans are all that is needed. Leg 2 is sufficient.
If all students were well informed, that argument would be strong, and consump-
tion smoothing through income-contingent loans would be all that is necessary. But
not all potential students are well informed. In particular, if they underestimate the
benefits of higher education and/or overestimate the costs, it might be rational for
them, given what they know, to be unwilling to take out a loan. This is the origin of
so-called debt aversion.
Addressing the problem requires measures to tackle exclusion which, it can be
argued, has three roots: financial poverty, information poverty, and poor school edu-
cation.
Measures to address financial poverty should be wide-ranging.
 An income-tested stipend for children above the minimum school leaving age
would encourage them to complete school.
 An income-tested grant should cover some or all costs at university. There are
advantages in offering full scholarships to first-year students from poor back-
grounds, who may not be well informed about whether they are well suited to
university. By the end of their first year they are no longer badly informed and,
if doing well, are more prepared to finance the rest of their degree, at least in
part, through a loan.
 Both policies could be supported by financial incentives to universities to
widen participation, and by extra resources to provide additional intellectual
support at university for students from disadvantaged backgrounds.
A second set of money measures supports access by offering assistance for people
with low incomes after graduation.
 Targeted interest subsidies could freeze the real value of debt of people with
low earnings, including people who are unemployed.
 People with low lifetime earnings could be protected by writing off any loan
not repaid after (say) 25 years.
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 The loans of workers in the public sector could be progressively written off. In
the UK, 10 per cent of the loan of new teachers in shortage subjects is written
off for each year in the state system. That scheme could be extended to other
groups.
 People caring for young children or elderly dependants could be granted loan
remission - for example, 10 per cent of outstanding debt for each year caring
for a pre-school child and 5 per cent per year if the child is of school age.
Information poverty, the second strategic impediment to access, is inadequately
emphasized. Action to inform school children and raise their aspirations is therefore
critical. The saddest impediment to access is someone who has never even thought
of going to university.
Finally, problems of university access cannot be solved entirely within the high-
er education sector. More resources are needed earlier in the system, not least
because of the growing evidence (Feinstein, 2003) that the roots of exclusion lie in
early childhood.
III. LESSONS FROM COUNTRY EXPERIENCE
Country experience supports the strategy just discussed.10 
(I) FINANCING UNIVERSITIES: LESSONS ABOUT FEES
Three lessons should be pondered: fees relax the supply-side constraint; big-bang
liberalization is politically destabilizing; but no liberalization is also a mistake.
Fees relax the supply-side constraint
The funding of higher education faces a paradox. Large taxpayer subsidies can cre-
ate supply-side constraints because of the desire to contain public spending. Where
qualified students have no automatic entitlement to a place, the constraint takes the
form of a view (typically by the Treasury) about student numbers. The result can be
a high-quality system, but one which turns away qualified applicants. In countries
where students have a right to a place, cost containment impacts mainly on quality.
In contrast, in countries which offer less public funding per student (e.g. the USA),
the re are no externally imposed supply-side constraints. Unless limited taxpayer
funding is sufficiently redistributive, however, students from lower-income back-
grounds will be deterred from applying. Thus high subsidies can harm access on the
supply side, but their absence can harm it on the demand side. This is the dilemma
which Legs 2 and 3 of the strategy are designed to alleviate.
Table 1 shows public and private spending on higher education in OECD coun-
tries, and also participation rates. Given the differences in country systems and in
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Skills (2003).
definitions, comparisons should not be pushed too far. However, in a range of coun-
tries (Australia, New Zealand, Korea, and (from other data sources) Canada and the
USA), high private spending goes along with high participation rates. A few coun-
tries combine high participation with little private spending, notably Finland and
Sweden, but only because those are the two countries with the highest public
spending on higher education-levels that might be unsustainable given other bud-
getary demands and international competitive pressures.
What matters is not only the total amount of private spending, but also how it is
determined. With fiat fees, government controls total funding. If fees go up and pub-
lic spending on higher education declines, all that happens is a change in balance
between public and private funding. In 1989, Australia introduced centrally-set
tuition fees to address a funding crisis. Over the years, fee income increased but tax
funding fell back. By 2000, the system was back in crisis, leading to reform,
announced in 2003, partially liberalizing fees.
Big-bang liberalization can be politically destabilizing
In 1992, New Zealand introduced twin reforms: fees set by universities, with no con-
straint on fee levels; and student loans which (a) had income contingent repay-
ments, (b) charged a positive real interest rate related to the government's cost of
borrowing, and (c) covered all fees and realistic living costs.
On the face of it, these arrangements were close to the strategy outlined above, but
mistakes were made. First, reform was to some extent big-bang. Student loans were
new, and fees, though not new, were fully liberalized. Second, though the system
included targeted interest subsidies for low earners, more could have be en done. In
addition, the third leg of the strategy - active measures to promote access - was not
strongly emphasized. Fourth, and equally important, the politics were not handled
well: the government treated reform as an event not a process and, having implement-
ed the reforms, stopped campaigning for them; in particular, the government did not
do enough to explain to students and parents the considerable advantages of income-
contingent repayments. As a result, when nominal student debt rose over the years,
worried middleclass parents created political pressures. The scheme was diluted in
2000 (for assessments, see Larocque, 2003; McLaughlin, 2003).
Without liberalization quality and access suffer
The opposite policy direction - no liberalization - is equally a mistake. 'Free' higher
education or low fixed fees create two problems. Quality suffers because the educa-
tion budget has to compete with other budgetary imperatives; and, within the edu-
cation budget, universities compete with nursery education, school education, and
vocational training. As a result, real funding per student declines.
Access also suffers. If places are scarce, it will disproportionately be middle-class
students who get them; and if places are not scarce, the need to finance a mass sys-
tem typically means that resources for the pro-access strategy are limited.
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(II) STUDENT SUPPORT: LESSONS ABOUT LOANS
This section focuses on four lessons: income-contingent loans do not harm access;
interest subsidies are expensive; positive real interest rates are politically feasible;
and the design of the student loan contract matters.
Table 1. Spending on Tertiary Education and Participation Rates, OECD 
Notes: a The net entry rate is based on the probability of a 17-year-old entering higher education for the
first time by the age 30. 
n.a. = not available. Numbers do not always add up, due to rounding.
Source: OECD (2003).
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Spending as % of GDP, 2000 Net entry rate
2001aPublic Private Total
Australia 0.8 0.7 1.6 65
Austria 1.2 0.0 1.2 34
Belgium 1.2 0.1 1.3 32
Canada 1.6 1.0 2.6 n.a.
Czech Republic 0.8 0.1 0.9 30
Denmark 1.5 0.0 1.6 44
Finland 1.7 0.0 1.7 72
France 1.0 0.1 1.1 37
Germany 1.0 0.1 1.0 32
Greece 0.9 negligible 0.9 n.a.
Hungary 0.9 0.3 1.1 56
Iceland 0.8 0.0 0.9 61
Ireland 1.2 0.3 1.5 38
Italy 0.7 0.1 0.9 44
Japan 0.5 0.6 1.1 41
Korea 0.6 1.9 2.6 49
Mexico 0.8 0.2 1.1 25
Netherlands 1.0 0.2 1.2 54
New Zealand 0.9 n.a. 0.9 76
Norway 1.2 negligible 1.3 62
Poland 0.8 n.a. 0.8 67
Portugal 1.0 0.1 1.1 n.a.
Slovak Repub1ic 0.7 0.1 0.8 40
Spain 0.9 0.3 1.2 48
Sweden 1.5 0.2 1.7 69
Switzerland 1.2 n.a. 1.2 33
Turkey 1.0 negligible 1.0 20
United Kingdom 0.7 0.3 1.0 45
United States 0.9 1.8 2.7 42
OECD average 0.9 0.9 1.7 47
Income-contingent loans do not harm access
Australia introduced a system of income-contingent loans in 1989 to cover a newly
introduced tuition charge, and thus offers the longest historical record. Chapman
(1997; see also Chapman and Ryan, 2003) notes the increase in overall participation
since 1989 and finds, superimposed on that trend, that women' s participation
grew more strongly than men' s, and that the system did not discourage participa-
tion by people in the lowest socioeconomic groups. Similarly, though participation
by Maoris and Pacific Islanders needs continuing work (McLaugh1in, 2003, p. 37),
participation in New Zealand since the introduction of fees has increased for all
groups.
There are two sets of reasons why we should expect these results. First, the
income-contingent mechanism is designed explicitly to reduce the risks borrowers
face. Second, fees supported by loans free resources to promote access.
A recent study emanating from Statistics Canada offers empirical support for the
overall strategy in section II(v). Canada liberalized fees (Leg 1) in the early 1990s
with no changes to Legs 2 and 3. Predictably, access suffered. In the mid-1990s, the
loan limits on the student loan scheme were raised, with knock-on increases in
other forms of loan and student support. Again, predictably, access improved,
notwithstanding that the Canadian loan scheme is not income-contingent. The
report concluded that:
Interest subsidies are expensive
Simulations by Barr and Falkingham (1993, 1996) found that for every 100 the gov-
ernment lends, only about 50 is repaid. Of the missing 50, 20 is lost because some
graduates have low lifetime earnings and so never repay their loan in full, and 30 is
not repaid because of the interest subsidy. In other words, the interest subsidy con-
verts nearly one third of the loan into a grant. Sales of student debt by the UK gov-
ernment in the late 1990s offer independent evidence. The debt was sold for about
50 per cent of its face value. Official estimates suggest that of the missing 50, about
15 was because of low lifetime income, etc., and 35 because of the interest subsidy.
The evidence is compelling because the two sets of results are independent, the lat-
ter with a market test.
New Zealand offers parallel evidence. A government elected in 1999 acted early
on a manifesto commitment. It introduced an interest subsidy in the form of a zero
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There is a clear positive correlation between parental income and university attendance,
and this correlation. … became stronger during the mid-1990s when tuition fees began
increasing significantly. This change reflected declines in participation rates of youth from
middle income families. … The correlation, however, declined during the latter half of the
decade reflecting rises in participation of those from the lowest income groups. This pat-
tern is consistent with the fact that the changes in the Canada Student Loans Program rais-
ing the maximum amount of loan occurred only after tuition fees had already begun to
rise. (Corak et al., 2003, p. 14)
nominal interest rate while a student was still at university (previously a real inter-
est rate was charged from the time the student took out the loan). In addition, the
real interest rate charged after graduation was frozen at somewhat below its previ-
ous rate. The impact of these changes was startling. Previously, according to official
estimates, of every 100 that was lent, 90 would be repaid. As a result of the changes,
it was estimated that only 77 out of every 100 would be repaid (New Zealand
Ministry of Education, 2002, p. 7). The change is so expensive precisely because the
subsidy to students while still at university applies to all students. A key message is
that seemingly small adjustments can be very expensive.
Not least for these reasons, an official inquiry, echoing the discussion in section
II(iii), concluded:
Positive real interest rates are feasible
In the Netherlands and Sweden (and, no doubt, elsewhere), as in New Zealand until
the changes in 2000, a real interest rate is charged from the moment the student
takes out the loan, both matters which are taken for granted. As noted earlier, with
income-contingent loans a higher interest rate does not increase a graduate's month-
ly repayments, only the duration of the loan.
Contract design is important
International labour mobility is high and, with EU enlargement, likely to increase,
raising questions about potential default if a person emigrates. In Australia, loan
repayments are part of a person's tax liability, so that someone outside the
Australian tax net has no liability to make repayments. With interest subsidies this
is a costly error. In the UK, in contrast, there is an explicit loan contract which
includes the collection of repayments through the tax system, but does not
exempt a person outside the UK from making repayments. Clearly, default and
administrative costs are higher for people working abroad, but the effect is not
large. Certainly there is no question of emigration causing a repayment black
hole.
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Participation goals should continue to be supported through a Student Loan Scheme with
income-contingent repayments as at present. The Commission believes, however, that the
current policy of writing off interest on loans for … students while they are studying is not
an effective use of the government's resources. While this policy has decreased the length
of time taken to repay loans after graduation, it has also led to an increase in the number
of students taking out loans and in the overall level of student debt. To compound matters,
the policy has made it possible for learners to borrow money and invest it for private gain
(arbitrage). Consequently, the Commission believes that this policy should be discontin-
ued - or that, as a minimum, the incentives for arbitrage should be removed. Any savings …
should be reinvested in the tertiary education system and be used for the benefit of stu-
dents. (New Zealand Tertiary Education Advisory Commission, 2001, p. 14)
IV. THE 2004 REFORMS IN THE UK
(I) ASSESSMENT
Reforms in 1998 brought in income-contingent loans, for which loud cheers11.
Beyond that, however, the system had serious problems (Barr and Crawford, 1998;
Barr, 2002):
 central planning continued;
 fees were introduced, set by central government and the same for all subjects
at all universities, and fees were an upfront charge, since there was no loan to
cover them;
 loans displayed serious design problems-they were too small to cover realistic
living costs (let alone fees), and incorporated an interest subsidy;
 on the access front, the 1998 reforms abolished the previous system of grants
which partially covered a student's living costs.
I strongly support the UK reforms of2004 because they address most of these prob-
lems (see Barr, 2003). They simultaneously conform with the strategy in section
II(v), based on economic theory, and accommodate the main lessons from country
experience. Other countries had attempted to move in the same direction for the
same reasons (Commonwealth of Australia, 1998; New Zealand Ministry of
Education, 1998), but were unable to move forward for a variety of reasons, not least
political opposition.
Leg 1. Tuition fees
From 2006, the reforms replace the upfront flat fee with a variable fee between
0 and L3,000 per year. Within those limits each university can set the fee for each of
its courses. Students can pay the fee upfront or take out a loan. In the latter case, the
student loans administration pays the fee directly to the university, whose financial
position is therefore independent of how students choose to pay their fees.
As discussed earlier, variable fees improve efficiency by making funding open-
ended, hence increasing the volume of resources going to higher education and, by
strengthening competition, improve the efficiency with which those resources are
used. Both trends are assisted by appropriate regulation, for example the cap on the
maximum fee.
The equity advantages of variable fees were also discussed earlier. They con-
tribute to access by redistributing from better-off to worse-off; they facilitate redis-
tribution from universities with more market power to those with less; they are
directly fairer, in that students do not have to pay the same fee at a small local uni-
versity as at an internationally famous one; and they reduce discrimination against
home students if there is a differential between home and overseas fees.
Alongside these advantages of principle, the fees regime also draws on interna-
tional experience by liberalizing fees, but not completely. The fees cap is crucial in
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this context. It should ideally be high enough (a) to pay the best universities the rate
for the job and (b) to bring in competition, but low enough (c) to ensure that the
new regime is politically sustainable by giving students and parents time to adjust,
and (d) to give universities time to put in place management suitable for a compet-
itive environment.
Leg 2. Loans
The 1998 reforms introduced income-contingent loans, but they did not cover
tuition fees and were too small to cover realistic living costs. The 2004 reforms
improve the system by extending loans to cover tuition fees and by increasing the
loan for living costs. They also raise the threshold at which loan repayments start:
from 2006, graduates will repay 9 per cent of earnings above L15,000 per year, up
from L10,000.
From the point of view of the student, the situation is little different from the
days of 'free' higher education: their fees are paid on their behalf, and money is paid
into their bank accounts to cover living costs. From the point of view of the gradu-
ate, the arrangements are like a system financed out of income tax, except that the
repayments (a) are only made by people who have been to university and benefited
financially and (b) do not go on forever.
Notwithstanding public anxiety, these repayments should not be exaggerated.
The taxpayer will continue to pay the bulk of the costs of higher education. And a
loan of (say) L20,000 should not be daunting compared with other expenditure:
over a 40-year career, a typical current graduate will pay (in cash terms) about
L850,000 in income tax and National Insurance contributions,12 and will spend
about L 1 million on food. As an alternative comparator, it is possible to pay off
L10,000 of student debt in about 10 years by giving up a smoking habit of 20 ciga-
rettes per day (Barr, 2003, para. 84). Part of the problem is that people continue to
conflate credit-card debt (rightly a concern to parents), with income-contingent
loan repayments.
In one important respect, however, the loan arrangements conform neither with
theory nor country best practice - the 2004 reforms continue the interest subsidy.
Leg 3. Action to promote access
Grants to cover at least part of living costs, abolished in 1998, will be restored. From
2006, students from poor backgrounds will be entitled to a grant of L2,700 per year,
in addition to a loan;13 and universities charging fees of L3,000 will be expected to
33T A N U L M Á N Y O K
12 Dearden et al. (2004) estimate payments of income tax and National Insurance contributions of
L300,000. Their figure is lower than mine mainly because it (a) covers a shorter time period, (b) is in
real terms, and (c) starts from a lower starting salary. The point is not the exact number, but that loan
repayments are small relative to income tax and National Insurance contributions. 
13 Students receiving the maximum grant are entitled to a somewhat reduced loan.
provide students from poor backgrounds with bursaries of at least L300 per year to
help to pay those fees. The intention is that no student from a poor background will
be made worse-off by the reforms.
The Act also brings in an Access Regulator, whose formal task is to ensure that
institutions have satisfactory plans to widen access as a quid pro quo for charging
higher fees. Those plans can include scholarships for students from poor back-
grounds; importantly, they can also include outreach to schools to improve the
information available to schoolchildren.
(II) REMAINING ISSUES
In sum, the arrangements, which are intended to come fully into effect in 2006,
bring in additional resources and strengthen competition, both of which contribute
to quality, and redistribute from better- to worse-off, contributing to access. Those
desirable features do not, however, mean that the scheme is perfect.
Fees
The desirability of a cap on fees was discussed earlier. Some commentators argue
that the cap is too low and/or that it will be kept at L3,000 for too long (roughly the
life of a Parliament). This is a balancing act. If the cap is too high, it risks destabiliz-
ing the system politically, but if it is too low for too long, most universities will
charge the maximum, approximating a system of flat fees. The result would be to
reintroduce closed-ended funding and to restore central planning by the back door.
Loans
Notwithstanding the improvements, loans display continuing problems. The inter-
est subsidy is expensive and regressive. In addition, the reforms raised the threshold
at which graduates start to make repayments. The change reduces the repayments
of ali graduates, hence increases the average duration of repayment, and hence
increases the leakage caused by the interest subsidy.
Digging more deeply, matters are even worse. Student loans are currently off-
budget. Thus eliminating the interest subsidy yields saving only off budget.
Redirecting those savings towards larger grants (for example) would involve on-
budget sp ending; that is, would increase measured public spending.
What is needed, therefore, is a twofold reform: eliminating the blanket interest
subsidy and replacing it by a targeted subsidy; and bringing loans on budget for rea-
sons of rational public budgeting.14 These reforms would make it possible to offer
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14 For more detailed discussion of targeted interest subsidies and a critique of the Education
Department's position, see Barr (2003, paras 104-20); see also UK Education and Skills Select
Committee (2003).
somewhat larger loans, and to offer all students a full loan; they would also free con-
siderable resources for pro-access policies.
Access measures
More could be done to protect low-earning graduates as described in section II(v);
for example, targeted interest subsidies, loan-write-off for some public-sector work-
ers, and loan remission for people undertaking caring activities.
A second area of potential progress is to address public concerns by improving
information. Some of these worries are that:
 the new system will leave students with large debts;
 higher participation will lower the return to getting a degree;
 student debt will make it harder to get a mortgage; 
 variable fees are inequitable;
 variable fees will harm access;
 variable fees will create a two-tier system; 
 it is morally wrong to charge for higher education. 
 this is the start of a slippery slope.
Some of these concerns have been discussed in this paper. For responses to the oth-
ers, see Barr (2003, paras 121-30).
V. THE UNFINISHED AGENDA
Economic theory and practical experience offer solutions to avoidable problems:
(a) unsustainable public spending; (b) public spending which is hijacked by the
middle class; (c) loans absent, or badly designed, so that they bring in few, if any,
extra resources; (d) economic constraints on universities, which reduce incentives
to efficiency; and (e) specific design features that are costly (interest subsidies),
administratively demanding (income testing), or both.
These are widespread in OECD countries, though (b) and (d) are less of a prob-
lem in countries which allow variable fees. They also occur elsewhere: an account
of Latin America reported that
The policy in section II(v) is designed as a strategic whole explicitly to address
these problems. Each of the elements - deferred variable fees, income-contingent
loans, and active measures to promote access - can be crafted in various ways and
with differing weights, to reflect differences in national objectives and different
constraints. Broadly, the strategy is applicable to any country which can do an effec-
tive job in collecting income tax-and hence student loan repayments.
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Most of the public institutions … have argued that low or no tuition fees have provided
greater equality of educational opportunity by providing greater access. … Such reasoning
is simply incorrect … the overwhelming public subsidy has been and continues to accrue
to students from middle and high-income families. (Lewis, 1999)
The three elements offer a benchmark against which countries could assess
future policy directions. The USA, for example, does well on Leg 1 (variable fees)
but less well on Leg 2 (loans are not income-contingent, nor collected as a payroll
deduction, and generally attract an interest subsidy) and Leg 3 (where scholarship
arrangements can be criticized both for parsimony and complexity). Canada, too,
might consider action on the second leg. Australia has recently moved partially to
liberalize fees under Leg 1, but its loan scheme, though with income-contingent
repayments collected by the tax authorities, does not cover living costs for most stu-
dents, and continues to include a blanket interest subsidy. New Zealand came close
to getting all three elements right in the 1990s but was burnt by moving too fast.
Most countries in mainland Western Europe and in the Nordic countries have yet to
address fees under Leg 1, and with few exceptions, have work to do on the loans
front.
In these Western countries, the unfinished agenda has more to do with politics
and administration than with policy.
 In many of the European countries, tuition fees for higher education are a no-
go area - a Nordic education minister used the word 'taboo'. The British govern-
ment showed considerable courage in addressing these serious political obsta-
cles. Other governments will have to do the same, sooner or later. Their task
should be made easier by the example of countries such as England, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand.
 Greater public understanding both of the centrality of higher education and of
the nature of income-contingent repayments has thus far been slow in coming,
and merits continuing effort.
 International cooperation in collecting loan repayments (discussed briefly in
Barr, 200la, ch. 14) requires attention with increasing urgency as international
labour mobility increases both generally and within the wider EU.
Outside the OECD a challenge that continues to haunt commentators is how to
design a loan scheme which mimics income-contingent repayments in poorer coun-
tries with a large informal sector and only limited capacity to collect income tax.
This is, perhaps, the greatest challenge of all.
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